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Robert Bly liked Stevens' early poems but not his later ones: "The late 
poems are as weak as is possible for a genius to write; what is worse, most of 
them have the white nightgown mentality" (76). The phrase "white night-
gown" is from Stevens' "Disillusionment of Ten O'Clock" (Harmonium); the 
wearers of white nightgowns are the cautious people who, secure in their 
houses, do not enjoy colour, those who do not "dream of baboons and 
periwinkles." The implication is that Stevens slipped into that blank mind-set, 
as he got older. Certainly Stevens disapproves of the white-nightgown 
mentality. Much of his early poetry is a sermon on the value of the beauty of 
this world. In "Sunday Morning," for instance, he asks of a white-nightgown 
wearer, 
What is divinity if it can come 
Only in silent shadows and in dreams? 
Shall she not find in comforts of the sun, 
In pungent fruit and bright, green wings, or else 
In any balm or beauty of the earth, 
Things to be cherished like the thought of heaven? 
This is easy to comprehend: the details of the real world surpass abstract 
images of paradise: "And shall the earth I Seem all of paradise that we shall 
know?" The answer comes soon: of paradise Stevens writes, 
Why set the pear upon those river-banks 
Or spice the shores with odors of the plum? 
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Alas, that they should wear our colors there, 
The silken weavings of our afternoons, 
And pick the strings of our insipid lutes! 
Death is the mother of beauty ... 
Here we have Stevens' characteristic aesthetics of ordinary human reality; as 
he says in "Adagia," "The ultimate value is reality" (912). It is possible to 
regard "Sunday Morning" as a sad and resigned affirmation that we have at 
most this world and its parochial values, that we cannot have paradise at all 
(d. Gelpi 1993). But that is not my view of the poem. 
Perception of colour and odour is more vital than dreams for Stevens. 
Thus we cannot take "Disillusionment of Ten O'Clock" as Bly seems to take it. 
It is not a straightforward condemnation of the white-nightgown mind-set, 
since the image with which it is contrasted is not simply admirable, since it is 
an image of dreams: 
Only, here and there, an old sailor, 
Drunk and asleep in his boots, 
Catches tigers 
In red weather. 
Drunk and asleep, the sailor does not perceive but only dreams; it is true that 
his travels have given him material for dreams that others may not have, but 
now he is sleeping, no longer awake to reality, which Stevens describes 
elsewhere as 
The weight of primary noon, 
The A B C of being 
The ruddy temper, the hammer 
Of red and blue, the hard sound-
Steel against intimation -the sharp flash, 
The vital, arrogant, fatal, dominant X. 
These are elements of reality that are more valuable than Images that are 
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"half dead" or in "an obscure world I Of things that would never be quite 
expressed" ("The Motive for Metaphor," Transport to Summer). If the sailor's 
images have value, it is only because they derive from his experience of this 
world; that is to say, it is important that he is an old sailor, for it is only his 
travels in the real world that tie his dreams to real tigers in real weather, 
and thus give his dreams value at all. However, he too has now fallen from 
the highest state that we may achieve: that of observer of the "weight of 
primary noon, I The A B C of being." 
Thus Stevens could say in a late poem ("The Planet on the Table," The 
Rock), 
Ariel was glad that he had written his poems. 
They were of a remembered time 
Or of something seen that he had liked. 
His self and the sun were one 
And his poems, although makings of his self, 
Were no less makings of the sun. 
It was not important that they survive. 
What mattered was that they should bear 
Some lineament or character, 
Some affluence, if only half-perceived, 
In the poverty of their words, 
Of the planet of which they were part. 
To see this wish to be poetic observer of the real world as a retreat from 
some early appreciation of otherworldly dreams is to fail to see the point of 
the early poems. The same desire to grasp reality is present in the early 
poem "Tea at the Palaz of Hoon" (Harmonium): 
I was the world in which I walked, and what I saw 
Or heard or felt came not but from myself; 
And there I found myself more truly and more strange. 
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Another early poem, "Of the Surface of Things" (Harmonium), is 
especially interesting in this regard. 
In my room, the world is beyond my understanding; 
But when I walk I see that it consists of three of four hills and a cloud. 
From my balcony, I survey the yellow air, 
Reading where I have written, 
"The spring is like a belle undressing." 
The gold tree is blue. 
The singer has pulled his cloak over his head. 
The moon is in the folds of the cloak. 
In the first stanza there is, first, simple doubt about reality, ansmg from 
failure to perceive things as they are (a failure that is represented by being in 
"my room"). This doubt is followed by a too-simple judgement as to the 
nature of reality, arising from a failure to reflect at all when confronted by 
overwhelming perceptual images (while "walking"). In the first line of the 
second stanza, the poet stands awkwardly between "room" and world: on "my 
balcony." But a poetic voice emerges with the figure of surveying the yellow 
air. Is the air really yellow? Or is this a metaphor? If a metaphor, what does 
it signify, what comparisons does it invite? The context provided by the first 
stanza, with its juxtaposition of radical scepticism and naive confidence, 
inclines us to such wonder: between worlds (as it were), what is it that we 
see? Good poetry is afoot; but soon it dies, in the trite simile of the lines that 
"I have written." (This line is dead poetry, for we scarcely care to ask, in 
response to the proposition that the spring somehow resembles a woman 
undressing, "How so?") Struggling to rediscover the poetic voice, the poet 
continues with another metaphor, but it is one that, standing alone, leaves us 
blank: to say flatly that a gold tree is blue, without any context that might 
render the paradox meaningful, is not enlightening. In the following line, 
however, the glimmer of significant truth is found; it is a truth about the poet: 
Wallace Stevens and German Idealism: Reply to Bly 111 
he has, in his attempts to become poetic, lost sight of reality ("pulled his cloak 
over his head"). And then there is the haunting conclusion: "The moon is in 
the folds of the cloak." That is to say, the moon itself (reality) is in the poem 
(the cloak). But it is hidden there ("in the folds"). The job of the poet is to 
uncover it. That is how I read this poem; generally speaking, I read Stevens' 
poems, both his later ones and his earlier ones, as attempts to uncover reality. 
Returning to "Disillusionment of Ten O'Clock," we see that it presents 
images in a relationship of thesis (white-nightgown wearers) and antithesis 
(drunken dreamers); consequently it points to the need for synthesis. This 
would not be clear were it not for two things to which Bly directs our 
attention in his article: (1) the facts of Stevens' life as a sober businessman, 
and (2) the "path ... into ... intellectualist complexity, a criticism of dry reason 
from inside the palace of dry reason" that exists in Stevens' later work. Bly 
denounces both of these elements of Stevens' life and poetry, but in that he 
displays his failure to see Stevens' point. Bly fails to understand not only the 
point of the later work, but also the point of the early poems; for the latter 
are not simple hymns to incomprehension, unreason, drunkenness and dreams. 
The realistic poet-businessman could never have simply admired the drunken 
dreams of the sailor; they were juxtaposed with the too-cautious, dull life of 
the white-nightgown wearer, not to set them up as an ideal in the contrast, 
but to unsettle. 
Bly is delighted by the early poem "Metaphors of a Magnifico" 
(Harmonium). "How strange! ... How beautiful!" he exclaims (72). The poem 
describes and re-describes twenty men crossing a bridge into a village: the 
problem at first is how to represent the fact that there are both similarities 
and differences among the men and their actions: 
Twenty men crossing a bridge, 
Into a village, 
Are twenty men crossing twenty bridges, 
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Into twenty villages, 
Or one man 
Crossing a single bridge into a village. 
The problem is then rejected as "old song I That will not declare itself." The 
fact is rephrased, stripped of metaphor, but the new literal description (to the 
effect that X = X) too is rejected, on the same grounds. However, a "meaning" 
is found; it is a "meaning" comprising the vital details of the scene: 
The boots of the men clump 
On the boards of the bridge. 
The first white wall of the village 
Rises through fruit-trees. 
But the stanza continues, "Of what was it I was thinking? I So the meaning 
escapes." The poem finishes with a two line stanza expressing the remaining 
fragments of the "meaning" that was thought to have been discerned in the 
fact: "The first white wall of the village ... I The fruit-trees .... " Bly is 
delighted by this result; he calls the poem "a sort of guru poem." Stevens, 
however, was not satisfied; he spent the rest of his life as a poet trying to 
reconcile the "receptive faculty of sensibility" with the "active faculty of 
understanding," to use the Kantian terms for the essentially Kantian project 
(cf. Strawson 20). 
Bly dislikes the German idealists, whom he describes as 
creepy otherworldly types, worse than Pope Paul, academics who resembled 
gray jars, and who would ruin a whole state like Tennessee if put into it; 
people totally unable to merge into the place where they live -they could live 
in a valley for years and never become the valley. (73) 
He makes a good point here: the idealists who understood Hegel did not think 
that merging with nature in the sense of losing oneself and becoming the 
valley was a correct synthesis; for the purpose was to become part of nature 
as oneself The Hegelian synthesis was not to be a loss of self, in which the 
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principle of self-identity was abrogated; it was not supposed to erase 
distinctions and thus to create a "night in which all cows are black" (cf. Hegel 
79). Stevens understood that. Bly does not. Consequently Bly sees Stevens' 
struggle to understand the place of the jar as a gray jar, as abandoning the 
vision of synthesis with nature; Bly mistakenly sees Stevens' Hegelian 
struggle as a retreat into the mind-set of white nightgowns. 
The jar ("Anecdote of the Jar," Harmonium) was "Like nothing else in 
Tennessee," but that distinction is scarcely bad in itself, unless it is bad to be 
different, to be what you essentially are. Stevens appreciated the variety in 
nature, the distinctions between this and that, and also the distinction be-
tween " I " and "that." Bly does not grasp the depth or the beauty of the latter 
distinction. My primary purpose is not to criticize Bly; it is to comment on 
the importance of this subject-object distinction if we are to understand 
Stevens' later work. For his later poems are in the spirit of the Kantian 
struggle that was inherited by Hegel: to reconcile active subjective under-
standing in a natural world presented to receptive sensibility (to employ 
Kant's terms again). 
Bly, however, rails against "idealists" as he understands them, v1z. as 
"shadow-haters" (as if idealism in the metaphysical sense were somehow tied 
up with idealism in a moral sense; 7 4). He writes: 
By exclusive interest in "the truth," they exile the shadow, or keep it exiled . 
. . When Stevens takes his stand against all that, he takes a stand against 
perfect Paradises, against abstract churches, ... (7 4) 
The passage is interesting m several ways. First, "the truth," which is 
presumably ultimate truth, compnses ordinary truths; certainly Stevens 
believed that; so did the German idealists after Hegel (who decidedly opposed 
Schelling's image of the night in which all cows are black). Furthermore, if 
there is truth about "the shadow" of which Bly speaks, then "the truth" 
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encompasses it too; that is the second point. Thirdly, what is the shadow? 
The term "shadow" is borrowed by Bly from Jung, who once, according to 
Booth (2), criticized his disciples for a "nit-picking discussion of the concept 
by protesting, 'This is all nonsense! The shadow is simply the whole uncon-
scious.'" Certainly the notion of the whole unconscious is an abstraction; in 
fact it is an abstraction of just the sort concerning which an anti-rationalist 
like Bly should presumably be skeptical. However, abstractions are not all 
bad (of course); I do not intend to discuss the merits of this one (viz. the 
whole unconscious), but it is odd for someone who embraces this abstraction 
to oppose the concept of reason. Perhaps there is in us something that we 
may profitably think of as the "unconscious," but certainly there is in us a 
faculty of reason. 
Bly, however, seems to want to reduce our significant mentation to the 
unconscious alone; in that he goes against the spirit of Stevens. Bly is like the 
farmer in Frost's "New Hampshire," 
... who failing as a farmer 
Burned down his farmhouse for the fire insurance, 
And spent the proceeds on a telescope 
To satisfy a life-long curiosity 
About our place among the infinities. 
Frost's point, of course, is that we learn our place in the world (nature) by 
reflecting on what we really are. Stevens' struggle to find our place included 
his attempt to represent, in poetry, the dialectical relations between our 
understanding and its objects. That was the essence of his attempt to 
understand us (possessors of dry reason as we essentially are). It is our 
nature to don white nightgowns occasionally, as it is the nature of a 
caterpillar to form a cocoon; neither we nor the caterpillar are thereby 
retreating from nature. On the contrary, we are simply being unabashedly 
what we are. Moralists may blame (or praise) us, but that is not a point of 
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metaphysics. As Bishop Butler wisely observed, "Everything is what it is and· 
not another thing;" we are what we are: human, rational to a substantial 
degree, self-centred, and rather jar-like. To deliberately turn one's eyes from 
what we really are, in the attempt to comment on our being in the world, is 
counter-productive. 
Bly conceives of "marriages" of darkness (77), but he does not contem-
plate marriages of dark and light. Stevens did: his poetry encompasses and 
synthesizes, with considerable success, even the forces of light. Thus he 
could live and work as a businessman as well as a poet, which is an achieve-
ment that Bly criticizes: 
Wall ace Stevens was not willing to change his way of life .... He kept the 
house fanatically clean, evidently slept in a separate bedroom for thirty or 
forty years, made his living through the statistical mentality, and kept his 
business life and poetry life separate .... (77) 
My point is that that was perfectly consistent with the insights (or struggles) 
of his poetry: to distinguish between the distinct while trying to integrate 
them (without diminishing or losing anything real). His way of life was in 
harmony with this Hegelian conception of truth (the synthesis of antitheses). 
Ad hominem, ironically Bly praises Tolstoy for wanting to free his serfs 
at the end of his life (thus stripping his family of the property that he had 
enjoyed when he could enjoy it). Bly comments (79), "He was willing to 
change his way of life that late!" Stevens, on the other hand, died as he lived, 
and lived as he wrote. A second irony is that Bly opposes the New Critics' 
assumption that "the author's life had no bearing whatever on the poem"; I 
say this is ironic because Bly fails to see Stevens' life as a text that bears on 
his poetry, in particular as a text that informs his later "dry" reason with 
new force. Stevens may have been a racist (man of his time as he was) and a 
snob, but in his profession, as in his poetry, there is responsibility to reality, 
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not a shirking of it. For Bly, however, it is praiseworthy to "live" one's 
"shadow," as Gauguin did (77), but not to live in the hard light of reason, as 
Stevens did. Bly quotes with approval from Rilke: 
The man who cannot quietly close his eyes 
certain that there is vision after vision 
inside, simply waiting until nighttime 
to rise all around him in the darkness -
he is an old man, it's all over for him. (77) 
It is an old question: Do we achieve knowledge by shutting our eyes or 
opening them? Bly and Rilke give one answer, Stevens another. "Who is 
right?" is another question, but Stevens should be read as a poet who 
struggled to keep his eyes open, not only on the world, but also on himself. 
Stevens believed (with Hegel) that visions that come in sleep are mere dreams. 
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